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Abstract 
 
Human factors and their implications for forensic science have attracted increasing levels 
of interest across criminal justice communities in recent years. Initial interest centred on 
cognitive biases, but has since expanded such that knowledge from psychology and 
cognitive science is slowly infiltrating forensic practices more broadly. This article 
highlights a series of important findings and insights of relevance to forensic 
practitioners. These include research on human perception, memory, context information, 
expertise, decision-making, communication, experience, verification, confidence, and 
feedback. The aim of this article is to sensitise forensic practitioners (and lawyers and 
judges) to a range of potentially significant issues, and encourage them to engage with 
research in these domains so that they may adapt procedures to improve performance, 
mitigate risks and reduce errors. Doing so will reduce the divide between forensic 
practitioners and research scientists as well as improve the value and utility of forensic 
science evidence. 
 
Keywords: human factors; expert; performance; bias; psychology; experience; training 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the forensic sciences have begun to engage with issues relating 
to human cognition and bias. One of the most conspicuous and important influences 
has been the recognition that research in experimental psychology (or the cognitive 
sciences) has serious implications for the organisation, production, reporting and 
evaluation of forensic science evidence [1]. This article reviews a range of 
mainstream research findings from the cognitive sciences and presents them in an 
accessible way to illustrate their significance to forensic practitioners and those 
relying on their evidentiary products. In this way it represents a contribution to the 
emerging discipline of cognitive forensics [2, 3]. This article is intended to help 
forensic practitioners familiarise themselves with relevant research in order to 
encourage individuals and institutions to consider how procedures, professional 
practice and evidentiary products might all be improved. 
Scientists who have studied and reviewed the forensic sciences have recommended 
the need to engage in formal evaluation, attend to human factors and present written 
and verbal evidence in ways that both fairly represent the results and facilitate 
comprehension. High profile cases such as Mayfield and McKie [4, 5], notorious 
experiments by Itiel Dror and colleagues [6], and reports by the NAS [7], NIST [1, 
8], PCAST [9] and others [10, 11], have drawn unprecedented attention to the need 
for forensic practitioners to engage with cognitive science and human factors. 
Concerns voiced in relation to the forensic sciences represent the most recent and 
conspicuous manifestations of a more widespread social trend involving the 
application of specialist knowledge to human activities in order to minimise risk. The 
practice of medicine, air traffic control, and managing nuclear power stations are 
examples of activities confronted with serious risks that have benefitted from the 
integration of cognitive science (knowledge and studies) into standard organisation, 
procedures and practice [12]. Unfortunately, change tends to occur following public 
failures or catastrophes. For the forensic sciences, problems emerged through the 
detection of high profile errors (many following the emergence of DNA profiling), 
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the findings of innocence projects, the results of the Criminal Case Review 
Commission and systematic reviews by agencies such as the FBI (e.g. bullet-lead 
comparison and microscopic hair comparison)[13]. 
Notorious mistakes have provided the much-needed impetus to encourage forensic 
practitioners, their institutions and regulators to contemplate the benefits of 
incorporating psychological and cognitive science research into their practices. Until 
recently, this knowledge had been largely overlooked in conventional thinking and 
practice across the forensic sciences. Following important reviews (e.g. the NAS [7] 
and NIST [1] reports), forensic practitioners can no longer credibly ignore 
mainstream scientific research, nor legitimately contend that training and experience, 
or knowing something about risks to cognition, in some way insulates their cognitive 
processes. The findings reported in this article are scientifically robust, many 
developed from decades of research in domains unrelated to forensic science or law. 
Legal institutions are, by and large, oblivious to the significance of many of these 
human factors, both the threats posed as well as their potential utility. Courts, for 
example, have been unwilling to exclude forensic science evidence where serious 
threats to conclusions were not addressed or even disclosed. There has, admittedly, 
been some interest in the expression of results (e.g. Tang v The Queen [14], R v T 
[15], Aytugrul v The Queen [16] and US v Monteiro [17]), although legal resolution 
has not been informed by mainstream scientific knowledge or consistent. Lack of 
systematic engagement with scientific research tends to be a hallmark of legal 
decision-making. Nevertheless, peak scientific and technical organisations have 
repeatedly recommended that cognitive processes in the production of forensic 
science evidence be studied and reformed in order to enhance probative value and 
assist with lay comprehension [1, 7]. 
Courts in most jurisdictions maintain a strong and perhaps exaggerated confidence in 
the ability of trial safeguards, operated by lawyers and judges, to identify and 
effectively convey potential risks and dangers with scientific, medical and technical 
forms of evidence [18]. This article is designed to help forensic practitioners, as well 
as lawyers and judges, obtain a clearer sense of findings flowing from scientific 
research. Regardless of what courts might require in terms of admissibility and 
procedural rules, scientific recommendations and professional obligations would 
seem to converge around increased engagement with mainstream scientific research 
and practices [19]. Insights provided by cognitive scientists will likely be an enduring 
feature of modern forensic science. Part of this legacy will be to reduce exposure to 
potentially biasing information, inform reporting, communication, selection and 
training procedures, and minimise the risk of contamination and error by improving 
workflows. 
Here we provide a variety of findings from mainstream scientific endeavours and 
present them in a form that is readily accessible to a wide audience. In doing so, we 
have tried to maintain a level of generality in order to avoid excessive didacticism or 
paternalism. We believe the kinds of insights explained in the following pages 
warrant attention. Forensic practitioners should not only be aware of this (and other) 
research, but they and their institutions should be thinking about how they might 
incorporate applicable insights to improve their performances and the quality of their 
evidentiary products. In conjunction with formal evaluation and rigorous proficiency 
testing, such responses will enhance the ability to provide impartial evidence that is 
demonstrably reliable. Engaging with the insights of experimental psychology will 
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help to insulate forensic practitioners from challenges and criticisms. Simultaneously 
it will contribute toward broader criminal justice goals and values.  
 
2. We do not experience the world as it really is 
 Human perception is not like a video camera. We do not experience the world 
as it is – so-called verisimilitude. 
 Our impression of the world is the result of an interpretive process, and 
depends on our attention, prior beliefs, expectations, experiences and 
knowledge. 
 
Human perception does not operate like a video camera. We do not experience a 
literal reproduction of the world, though we tend to think and act as though we do 
[20]. Even our perception of basic properties like size [21, 22], shape [23, 24] and 
colour [25, 26] is malleable, easily distorted by context, and often without conscious 
awareness. For example, spoken syllables can sound completely different when 
accompanied by footage of someone speaking [27], and identical chess pieces can 
appear black against one background and white against another [28]. These 
perceptual distortions occur frequently in everyday life, often with little consequence. 
However, in forensic disciplines requiring a human to make perceptual judgments of 
similarity, for example, these effects could be problematic. Importantly, simply 
knowing about the existence of these and other perceptual distortions does not 
insulate the perceiver from experiencing them, and forensic scientists are no 
exception. 
 
In the case of fingerprint comparison, examiners face the difficult task of comparing 
two unfamiliar and always different impressions side-by-side, and determining 
whether they were left by the same finger or two different fingers [29]. It is tempting 
to think that comparing such unfamiliar images involves an explicit and deliberative 
perceptual process, detached from memory or prior experience. However, empirical 
research suggests that what we, and what forensic practitioners see, is very much 
shaped by prior experience. This experience can be beneficial. For example, through 
training and on-the-job experience, latent fingerprint examiners can discriminate 
between most fingerprints at a glance, in visual noise, and when spaced briefly in 
time more accurately than novices [33, 34]. This prior experience however, can also 
be detrimental to performance. For instance, the similarity of a particular case to prior 
episodes (e.g., prior similar fingerprints or prior similar case information) influences 
image comparison judgments [35]. Similarly, fingerprint examiners’ judgments are 
not always consistent with themselves or each other, demonstrating that what we 
perceive is not purely a reflection of the visual information that we are presented 
with, but the product of a complex interaction between this visual information and 
external, often extraneous, inputs [36-39]. Forensic practitioners should be aware 
that, like all other humans, what they perceive and experience when viewing, 
comparing and interpreting samples, data or other results will be shaped by context, 
and their prior knowledge, biases, and expectations. 
 
3. Human memory is unreliable 
 Despite our best intentions, memory often fails without our knowledge. 
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 Many factors affect memory. 
 Forensic scientists should use documentation and empirical information 
rather than rely on memory or impressions. 
We cannot trust our memories. They are, at best, impoverished interpretations of 
reality. In a simple demonstration of the fallibility of memory, Roediger and 
McDermott [40] presented people with a list of 12 words (e.g., “bed”, “rest”, 
“awake”) and immediately afterward asked them to recall as many words as possible. 
On average, participants recalled 65% of the presented words. Most notably though, 
40% of participants reported seeing a word that had not been presented – the word 
“sleep”. Confidence in this false memory was extremely high. Despite participants’ 
best intentions on this basic memory task, their memories failed, and critically, they 
were none the wiser. The respondents’ introduction of “sleep” was of course not 
coincidental, but due to the thematic associations with the other words. 
Importantly, demonstrations of memory failures are not limited to highly controlled 
low-stakes laboratory experiments. The Innocence Project estimates that 72% of 
wrongful convictions are caused by failures of eyewitness memory [41]. One such 
case is that of Ronald Cotton, who was convicted of rape and burglary in 1985 based 
primarily on the testimony of the victim, Jennifer Thompson [41]. During the attack, 
Thompson made a deliberate effort to remember as much as she possibly could about 
her attacker, and impressed the police with her vivid and detailed account. When 
presented with a photo-lineup she declared with 100% confidence that Cotton was 
the man who raped her. However, Ronald Cotton was innocent, and served more than 
10 years in prison before being exonerated by DNA evidence in 1995. This case is 
one of many, and is a poignant illustration that memories can be completely 
unreliable despite deliberate effort to remember details of the event, considerable 
time to commit these details to memory, high levels of motivation to remember and 
recall the event correctly, and complete confidence in the accuracy of the memory. 
The notion that memory can be so catastrophically flawed is likely to be surprising to 
many. However, psychologists have studied human memory since the late nineteenth 
century and have found that memory errors can, and often do, occur in any of the 
three stages of memory. Errors can occur: during the event (encoding); while the 
event is stored in long-term memory (storage); and, when the memory is recalled at a 
later time (retrieval) [42].  
Encoding. As explained in Section 2, how we perceive and experience the world 
around us is shaped not only by visual, auditory and other sensory input, but by our 
expectations, experiences, emotions, beliefs, attention and a number of other 
seemingly irrelevant factors. We do not perceive things exactly as they occur, 
consequently our memories do not resemble a veridical “video recording” account of 
what happened (see Storage). For example, people typically overestimate the 
duration of unpleasant events [43, 44], and when very similar events are repeated 
multiple times, it is very difficult to remember specific details of each occasion [45-
47]. 
Storage. Events stored in long-term memory do not remain there permanently, 
unaltered until such time as they are recalled. Memories decay over time according to 
a logarithmic function [48], and they are frequently updated, altered and 
reconstructed based on new experiences, information and beliefs [49, 50]. 
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Retrieval. Even if a memory remains relatively intact up until the point of recall, the 
way in which memories are retrieved can influence their accuracy. For example, 
recollections of how we felt at a particular time are affected by our current 
knowledge and feelings about that event [51, 52]. We can unconsciously incorporate 
aspects of someone else’s account of a shared event into our own [53, 54], and even 
the way a question is asked can reduce the accuracy of the recalled memory. In a 
series of experiments Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues [55, 56] found that asking 
subjects “Did you see the broken headlight?” instead of “Did you see a broken 
headlight?” resulted in significantly more – and significantly more confident – 
reports of having observed a broken headlight even though, in reality, neither group 
saw one. 
The research is clear: despite our best intentions, human memory is fallible. Forensic 
practitioners should be aware of the limitations of memory, and take steps to mitigate 
the risk of memory errors. In practice, the exact procedures and processes used in 
casework, and any subsequent conclusions, should be thoroughly and 
contemporaneously documented. Moreover, when asked about how common 
something is – such as a feature in a fingerprint or a type or set of wounds – forensic 
practitioners should be reluctant to make recourse to their non-systematic 
experiences. Having performed ten thousand autopsies, for example, might not 
enable a forensic pathologist to accurately recall the frequency of a particular type of 
stab wound (see Gilham v R [57]). A latent fingerprint examiner probably cannot 
recall the frequency or inter-relatedness of features, notwithstanding having observed 
hundreds of thousands of fingerprints. Similarly, a podiatrist might not accurately 
recall the percentage of patients – a group that is not a representative sample of the 
general population – exhibiting eversion [58]. Forensic practitioners should be wary 
of placing too much reliance on, or confidence in, their memories. 
 
4. Contextual information alters our decisions 
 Contextual information can affect the decisions we make, without our 
awareness. 
 Contextual information can lead forensic practitioners to make mistakes 
and even reverse decisions. 
 Knowing the dangers does not enable forensic practitioners to take them 
into account or transcend them. 
 
We routinely use contextual information to assist us in making decisions. Factors 
such as mood [59], prior experiences[60] and peripheral information [61]  can all 
influence, and in some cases improve, decision-making. However, under some 
circumstances, making decisions in the presence of contextual information can lead 
to confirmation bias, where we deliberately seek out and interpret information in a 
manner that is consistent with our pre-existing beliefs or expectations [62]. For 
example, doctors tend to seek out evidence to confirm a diagnosis rather than 
formulate and investigate alternatives [63-65]. The tendency to rely on contextual 
information is an automatic and natural part of human perception and decision-
making [62], and generally operates without conscious awareness [66]. 
In the criminal justice system however, this effect can be problematic if forensic 
practitioners are exposed to extraneous information (such as crime facts or details 
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about suspects) while evaluating evidence [67]. In this situation, a practitioner may 
form an initial belief about the guilt or innocence of a suspect, or about an expected 
or desired outcome of their analysis. Under these conditions, particularly when the 
evidence is ambiguous or of poor quality [68], the practitioner may unconsciously 
evaluate evidence in a manner that confirms their initial belief; that is, they may seek 
out information consistent with their pre-existing belief and pay less attention to 
inconsistent information.. 
A now notorious study by Dror, Charlton and Péron [6] illustrates how forensic 
practitioners are vulnerable to contextual information. Experienced latent fingerprint 
examiners were presented with fingerprints in a way that suggested they did not 
match. However, the fingerprints were ones the examiners had already assessed and 
judged to match in previous casework. When the examiners unwittingly re-evaluated 
the fingerprints with the suggestive information, the majority (four out of five) made 
decisions that contradicted their previous decisions (either that the fingerprints did 
not match or were inconclusive). This study clearly demonstrates that contextual 
information can influence the interpretations of forensic evidence, even where 
practitioners use otherwise robust procedures. 
Further empirical studies across a range of disciplines have shown the large effect 
contextual information can have on evaluative opinions. For instance, knowledge of a 
suspect’s confession resulted in significantly more match than non-match opinions on 
handwriting samples [69]. Presentation of skeletons in a mass grave made forensic 
anthropologists more likely to report the presence of trauma compared to other less 
suggestive archaeological or control contexts [70]. Viewing highly emotive crime 
scene photographs resulted in fewer match judgments on human bitemark 
comparison tasks, compared to when this contextual information was not provided 
[71]. Even software designed to assist decision-making, such as the relative ranking 
of highly similar fingerprints in AFIS, significantly influences examiners’ judgments 
[72]. 
The influence of contextual information on decision-making is an unconscious and 
generally adaptive strategy. However, in the forensic sciences it is necessary to 
protect against bias to ensure decisions are based only on information relevant to the 
analysis [67, 73]. Procedural mechanisms for managing the influence of contextual 
information, such as sequential unmasking (at a case or discipline level) or the 
introduction of blind analytic procedures, can help to minimise the problem [74-77]. 
If methods such as these are implemented, and forensic practitioners are not exposed 
to domain irrelevant (i.e. extraneous) information before evaluating evidence, the 
impact of contextual bias can be reduced. Although this may be difficult to 
implement in practice, forensic practitioners should be blinded to extraneous 
information for as long as possible [78, 79]. 
 
5. Expertise is domain- and task-specific 
 An “expert” is someone who has demonstrated superior performance 
relative to the performance of novices. 
 Expertise does not simply transfer from one task to another. 
 Demonstrations of claimed expertise should be directly related to the 
specific skill. 
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Experts are those who produce consistently superior performance to non-experts or 
laypersons. Expertise, on the other hand, refers to the mechanisms underlying this 
superior performance [80]. Cognitive scientists have studied human expertise across 
a range of seemingly disparate domains, including chess [81], dermatology [87] and 
music [82]. As a result, the general nature of expertise and its development is well 
understood. 
It is common for experts to have had several years of experience, or to have engaged 
in thousands of hours of deliberate practice [82, 88]. Compared to novices, experts 
have a larger number of effective strategies for performing their work accurately [89-
91]. Experts rapidly retrieve, from memory, previous instances and decisions relevant 
to the current situation, while novices rely on formal rules and procedures [92, 93]. 
Experts can feel – in their “gut” – what the answer is, and they are often right. 
Novices, on the other hand, cannot rely on their intuition and are often wrong [83, 
94]. 
Some groups of people are capable of extraordinary feats of visual categorisation. For 
example, fire commanders can quickly, automatically and accurately determine when 
a building is about to collapse [85], and radiologists can detect an abnormal 
mammogram in less than one second [86]. Many forensic practitioners claim to 
possess similar levels of perceptual expertise (e.g. ballistics, fingerprints and facial 
comparison). In relation to these, and other claims of expertise, the first step is to 
establish, under controlled conditions (where “ground truth” is known), whether the 
claims of superior performance are justified. Somewhat counter-intuitively, highly 
trained, experienced, and qualified “experts” may fare no better than novices. 
Prominent examples include stockbrokers choosing profitable stocks [83], and 
passport officers matching photographs of faces [84] (see Section 8). 
Critically, superior performance in a particular domain does not guarantee superior 
performance in another, even when the domains seem similar [95]. Similarly, 
prowess at a particular task does not necessarily transfer to other seemingly similar 
tasks. An expert in human anatomy, for example, may not have expertise in 
comparing human faces or bodies for purposes of identification [96]. Expertise, 
therefore, is often described as “domain-“ and “task-specific”. The specialised nature 
of expertise can, unfortunately, also render experts inflexible and prone to influence 
from irrelevant external information [89, 97] (see Section 4). 
A thorough understanding of the nature of expertise, and how experts differ from 
novices, can help to: (i) inform the design of training procedures that turn novices 
into experts more efficiently; (ii) identify people who are likely to make good experts 
so they can be recruited over others; and, (iii) inform the design of work 
environments that promote optimal work performance. In forensic practice and 
criminal proceedings, the term “expert” should be reserved for practitioners who can 
demonstrate, by means of independent empirical evidence, superior performance to 
novices.  
 
6. We have limited insight into how we actually make decisions 
 Experts often make decisions automatically and without conscious effort. 
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 Experts do not always possess insight into how they came to their 
decision, and so may not be able to explain the real reasons for their 
interpretation. 
 Experts may provide reasons, but these might be retrospective 
rationalisations that do not correspond with the actual reasons for a 
decision. 
 Asking experts to explain how they came to a decision can reduce 
performance. 
 
Many of the activities that we perform everyday happen automatically and with little 
cognitive effort. Reading, carrying on a conversation, or riding a bicycle all require 
very little insight into the psychological processes that produce these complex 
behaviours. Squiggles on a page or verbal utterances are instantly rendered into fully 
formed concepts. Continuous tiny adjustments to one’s centre of mass, handlebar 
position, and pedal stroke happen effortlessly. The reason that these tasks feel 
automatic and effortless is because we have accumulated countless similar 
experiences, so under normal circumstances, these everyday behaviours happen “to 
us” and demand very little attention and control [83]. 
 
When asked to articulate or explain the nature of these behaviours, we have almost 
no awareness of their operations. As your eyes move across each of the twisted little 
marks on this page, you are probably not thinking about word structure, grammar, 
and syntax. You may not remember learning to distinguish one mark from another. 
You simply open your eyes and comprehend the meaning of the various shapes as 
though they themselves are units of thought. Indeed, focusing too much on the details 
of language, a conversation, or one’s own motor movements can cause a 
conversation (or bicycle ride) to come to a screeching halt. But under unusual 
circumstances – reading a doctor’s handwriting, conversing with someone with a 
strong accent in a noisy pub, or riding a unicycle – our experience may be of limited 
utility. On these tasks we may revert to the condition of novices, once again having to 
devote significant concentration and effort to the task. 
 
There are several activities—like reading—that most adults have mastered and 
perform easily and automatically. Similarly, most experts, by definition, have 
accumulated years of experience in their respective domains: distinguishing normal 
from abnormal symptoms [98], one bird species or wine variety from another [99, 
100] or distinguishing fingerprint patterns produced by the same person or two 
different people [101]. To these experts, processing the objects in their domain feels 
just as simple as reading feels to us. A radiologist just opens her eyes and sees a 
mammogram as cancerous or asymptomatic [86], and a fingerprint examiner can 
almost instantly classify a pair of fingerprints as matching or not matching [34].  
 
In addition to automaticity and effortlessness, these experts likewise possess no 
special insight into the psychological processes that underpin these complex 
behaviours. Indeed, there has been a great deal of work in experimental psychology 
on the unreliability of introspection in everyday decision-making (e.g., [102]; see 
[103] for a review). This evidence suggests that we have no direct access to the 
cognitive processes that determine the choices we make, even though it often feels 
like we do. This impression has been described as the introspection illusion [104]. A 
particularly vivid example of this illusion was illustrated by Johansson and 
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colleagues, who demonstrated that people can be misled into confabulating details 
about a choice that they did not in fact make. For example, in deciding which of two 
people is more attractive, a participant might select Photo A. Using sleight of hand, 
the experimenter swaps the two photographs and asks the participant to elaborate on 
why they selected Photo B (the photo they did not select). Oblivious to the switch, 
participants readily provide detailed justification for why the person they did not 
select is more attractive [105]. More generally, dozens of experiments on self-
assessment have concluded that the relationship between actual performance and 
self-rated performance is weak at best (see [106] for a review).  
 
These basic findings and failures of introspection have direct implications for expert 
testimony. Experts see objects and situations differently and deploy their skills 
automatically, largely outside conscious awareness [83, 89, 107]. Expertise in a 
specific domain does not necessarily include the ability to articulate the basis of that 
expertise or the reasons for a decision or action. Asking experts to describe what they 
are doing, for example, can hurt performance [108, 109]. Despite the expectations 
and requirements of legal reports and testimony, experts may not have access to the 
actual basis of their decision-making. Explanations may be post facto 
rationalisations, and responses to examination-in-chief and cross-examination might 
be misleading [94]. Given the potential for gaps between the information and 
processes that experts think they rely on and those actually used, legal questioning 
may be of limited value in exposing the basis of decision-making. This reinforces the 
need for robust, objective, and independent measures and demonstration of genuine 
expert performance. 
 
7. What experts say might not be what lay audiences hear 
 Communicating expert evidence is difficult and error prone. 
 Even when experts believe they are communicating clearly, non-experts 
will often interpret their statements in ways that are inconsistent with the 
intended message. 
 
Expert opinions in the forensic sciences are always uncertain [110]. The expert 
almost never knows if a particular finger made a latent fingerprint or if a particular 
gun fired a particular bullet. They must estimate the likelihood of the observations if 
this had occurred, and compare that with the likelihood of the observations under 
alternative explanations (e.g., some other finger or gun was involved) [111]. Fact 
finders are therefore placed in a position where they must interpret and evaluate 
expert expressions (often in conjunction with other evidence) in order to reach a final 
determination regarding the guilt or innocence of a suspect.  
There is a large literature relating to decision-making under uncertainty and the 
interpretation of probabilistic and other expressions [112, 113]. For example, 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks [114] were interested in how lay persons interpreted the 
verbal expressions utilized by forensic odontologists, namely: “reasonable scientific 
certainty”, “probable”, “consistent with” and “match” [9]. The odontologists intended 
“reasonable scientific certainty” to communicate the highest degree of certainty, with 
no reasonable probability of error. The level of certainty was meant to decrease from 
there such that “match”, their lowest level, communicated only “some similarity”. 
When lay persons were asked to rate the strength of each expression on a scale from 
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0 (low) to 100 (high), responses revealed discrepancies – clear evidence of 
misunderstanding and miscommunication. Contrary to the goals of the odontologists, 
“match” was rated the highest on average (M = 86.0%) and “probable” was rated the 
lowest (M = 57.4%), indicating that lay people did not understand the hierarchy in the 
manner intended. 
Evidence of miscommunication has also been found in cases where numerical rather 
than verbal expressions of uncertainty are relied upon [115]. A probabilistic weather 
forecast, such as: “There is a 30% chance of rain tomorrow” is one example of an 
uncertain numerical expression. Gigerenzer and colleagues [116] investigated 
whether people had a shared understanding of what a 30% chance of rain tomorrow 
means by asking respondents from five capital cities to choose from the following 
three options: a) it will rain tomorrow for 30% of the time; b) it will rain tomorrow in 
30% of the region; or c) it will rain on 30% of the days like tomorrow. The results of 
the experiment revealed that the most accurate answer “c” was regarded as the least 
appropriate option for respondents from Amsterdam, Berlin, Milan and Athens. Only 
those from New York considered it the most appropriate option. These results 
demonstrate that agreed upon numerical expressions do not guarantee consistent 
interpretation across audiences. Interpretations may vary between locations and be 
influenced by training, education, experience and other information. 
There is also evidence to suggest that jurors will fail to consider alternative 
explanations for events unless they are made explicit. In general, people will search 
for evidence to support their working hypothesis, while neglecting information which 
is inconsistent [62] (see Section 4). This confirmation bias can be heightened by the 
presentation of only one explanation – individuals cannot consider alternatives if they 
do not know they exist. Such tunnel vision has been attributed to investigators, 
forensic practitioners and jurors in numerous wrongful convictions [66]. Even where 
jurors are aware of, and strive to avoid, such biases, there is an additional danger that 
they may construct alternative explanations for forensic evidence – such as how 
DNA was deposited or why a defendant had glass on their clothing. Such 
explanations may not be relevant to the case or supported by the evidence [117]. The 
best method of avoiding both confirmation bias and misattribution of evidence is for 
experts to explicitly present the propositions that were considered, and explain how 
and why the evidence does or does not support each. In this manner, the expert is 
forced to consider the evidence in light of the various alternatives, and jurors may 
consider valid explanations for the evidence, while discounting invalid hypotheses 
[118].  
These and many other studies suggest that the communication of probabilities and 
uncertainty is a challenging process, and that consistency between intentions and 
interpretations cannot be assumed. It is vital that attention is given to the 
development of a shared vocabulary between experts and fact finders in order to 
maximise communication accuracy and efficacy, and to ensure the value of evidence 
as understood by the expert is not lost in translation. 
 
8. Experience does not necessarily translate into expertise 
 Extensive experience doing some task does not necessarily mean 
performance will be superior to that of a person with less or no 
experience. 
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 Experts should demonstrate superior accuracy relative to novices. 
Courts have traditionally used experience as a proxy to determine expertise within 
specific domains or “fields”. Often this took place in the absence of empirical 
evidence of an individual’s claimed skill, though courts have generally been reluctant 
to require that information even when available [119, 120]. The opinions of forensic 
practitioners who have worked in a domain for many years, attended hundreds of 
crime scenes, performed thousands of autopsies, or provided evidence in numerous 
trials, will generally be admissible and may be assigned higher probative value than 
the opinions of practitioners who have not worked for as long, or on as many cases 
[121]. Numerous studies across a wide range of fields have demonstrated that 
exposure to, or experience with, a given procedure or activity does not in itself confer 
expertise [122]. 
In general, the amount of training and experience displays only a weak relationship 
with objective measures of performance. For example, superior proficiency in 
software design is not associated with experience [123, 124]. The performance of 
wine experts, detecting, describing and discriminating between characteristics of 
wines, is only slightly better than regular wine drinkers on blind trials [125, 126]. 
Treatment success and efficiency is not related to a clinical psychologist’s length of 
training and professional experience [127]. The outcomes of stock investment 
decisions are not demonstrably superior for financial advisers compared to novices 
[128, 129]. Novice drivers often demonstrate superior safe driving skills when 
compared to normal, experienced drivers for aspects which require explicit tuition 
and feedback [130]. 
While some studies demonstrate that experienced forensic practitioners are more 
accurate than novices [101, 131-133], it is not clear that higher levels of professional 
experience necessarily equate to higher levels of accuracy. Within the forensic 
domain, few studies have examined the relationship between experience and 
expertise or performance (cf. [84, 101]). Those that have show the same patterns 
found in other disciplines – experience does not predict performance success. For 
example, no relationship was found between expert forensic document examiners’ 
experience and the number of correct, incorrect or inconclusive opinions provided on 
questioned signatures where ground truth was known [134]. The study found 
substantial variation between examiners; uncorrelated with years of experience as 
examiners.  
What might explain this apparent dissociation between a person’s experience with a 
given task, and their ability to perform it accurately? As outlined below in Section 11, 
a critical factor in producing learning through experience is the provision of feedback 
on the accuracy of our decisions. It appears that, in many domains, practice without 
appropriate feedback (operating in so-called “wicked” environments, see [135]) does 
not enhance expertise or success [135, 136]. For example, unless doctors and nurses 
are provided with continuing training, they do not improve with extended experience 
[137, 138], and experienced passport officers perform no better than recent recruits 
on tests of face identification ability ([84], see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1. Experience does not equal expertise. The y-axis shows accuracy of 
Australian Passport Office staff on a face matching task resembling the face 
comparison decisions made in their daily work [84]. Researchers observed large 
individual differences in accuracy – some passport officers performed with near 
perfect accuracy, while others performed close to chance. Critically, these differences 
were not predicted by the number of years employed as a passport officer (x-axis).  
 
Experience alone is insufficient as a predictor of expertise and performance. Unless 
practitioners are provided with continuous training, involving deliberate practice on 
domain-specific tasks with associated feedback regarding their performance, levels of 
expertise are unlikely to change relative to the levels achieved during initial training 
[88]. The impact of training and available feedback on performance in most forensic 
science domains is currently unknown. It is possible that expertise could increase 
with years of continued practice and feedback, rendering experience a pertinent 
measure of expertise. However, opportunities to examine this relationship are rare in 
the forensic sciences, as many disciplines have either not developed regular expertise 
testing programs, based on known samples with appropriate feedback to 
practitioners, or access to such programs is limited. Bare experience tends to be relied 
on too heavily, especially by courts and decision-makers. Its value predicting 
expertise is limited at best. 
 
 
9. Unless genuinely independent, review (and verification) might not be effective 
 Forensic scientists sometimes make decisions in groups. 
 Group decision-making may introduce problems and biases (e.g., 
contextual information and confirmation bias mentioned in Section 4, 
transference of errors, group concurrence seeking, conformity, deference 
etc.). 
 Forensic practitioners should strive for independent reviews and explain 
the nature of their processes. 
 Independent decisions avoid many of these threats while conferring the 
benefit of allowing wisdom of the crowd analyses. 
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Forensic practitioners and forensic pathologists often reach decisions collectively or 
consult one another during the processing of information. In the forensic sciences it is 
common to hold laboratory meetings or to conduct peer review on forensic decisions, 
to ensure consensus and try to prevent costly errors. Although peer interactions 
provide potentially valuable safeguards, some types of interaction and review 
processes can be problematic. When reviews are not conducted independently, errors 
from the initial examination can be adopted by (or influence) the reviewer [67].  
It is however possible to  ensure that reviews or collective decision-making is 
beneficial for the forensic sciences. A large body of empirical research shows that 
group decisions are often most accurate when the independent decisions of individual 
group members are combined [139]. Indeed, aggregating the independent responses 
of many individuals tends to produce a remarkably accurate decision. This 
observation dates back to Sir Francis Galton [140] who calculated the average 
response in a “guess the ox’s weight” competition at a local country fair. 
Remarkably, the average estimate was within a few pounds of the 1200lb animal. 
This phenomenon has been replicated many times, across a diverse range of 
decisions, and is popularly referred to as the Wisdom of Crowds [141].  
Recently, studies have begun to examine the benefit of aggregating responses in 
forensic pattern matching decisions. Experiments with university students, 
aggregating independent facial image comparison decisions, produced very 
substantial gains in accuracy [142]. Further, professional facial examiners 
approached maximum performance on levels of identification accuracy when tasked 
with challenging facial comparison decisions once their judgments were averaged 
across examiners [131, 132].  
Technological advances provide digital platforms that are very well suited to the 
aggregation of individual examiner responses. In fingerprint examination, 
aggregating manual fingerprint mark-ups made by multiple examiners prior to 
submitting the fingerprint AFIS system produces 10% gains in the accuracy of AFIS 
hits [143]. This is because individual examiners often disagree on the locations and 
number of fingerprint minutiae [37], and so aggregating responses produces a more 
reliable template for the biometric system. 
These encouraging results suggest that forensic science can be improved by 
designing intelligent processes for group decision-making. In this context, 
disagreement between forensic practitioners can be viewed as a strength of the 
discipline, providing fertile ground for robust collective decisions. If the wisdom of 
crowds can be harnessed intelligently, while abiding by the golden rule of 
independence, group decision-making can make many forensic science procedures 
more reliable. 
As for conventional peer review, generally it is desirable for reviewers to be blind to 
the results of the initial analysis. This facilitates independent and blind peer review. 
Where, because of resources or workflows, this is not available, forensic practitioners 
should clearly explain what they mean by peer review and whether the review was 
independent or undertaken in the suggestive shadow of the initial analysis [19]. 
 
10. Confidence and Confidence Hardening 
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 Confidence is a poor predictor of accuracy. 
 Confidence in a decision tends to increase over time, especially if the 
person who made the decision receives some sort of confirmation – so-
called confidence hardening. 
 
When evaluating experts, jurors tend to believe that confidence is a reliable indicator of 
an expert’s accuracy and credibility. This is known as the Confidence Heuristic Model 
[144], whereby confidence acts as a heuristic cue that an expert is knowledgeable and 
believable. Jurors are therefore sensitive to the level of confidence reported by an expert 
and use this to evaluate whether the testimony should be believed or discounted. 
Eyewitness testimony research suggests that witness confidence can account for up to 
50% of the variance in jurors’ decisions of whether or not to believe the witness [145]. 
This figure is likely to be similar for expert witnesses. For example, an expert with low 
confidence may exhibit verbal and nonverbal cues characteristic of nervousness, such as 
a trembling voice and fixed eye contact. A highly confident expert, however, might not 
exhibit these nervous cues due to their belief in their scientific abilities or the correctness 
of their conclusion [146]. As a result, jurors may regard the highly confident expert as 
more credible and believable than the expert with low confidence. However, jurors are 
not alone in their reliance on confidence as an indicator of an expert’s accuracy. Judges 
and lawyers tend to prefer highly confident experts, even when they proffer less qualified 
conclusions [147]. 
Despite popular belief in a strong relationship between witness confidence and accuracy, 
research demonstrates this correlation is, at best, weak. The absence of a confidence-
accuracy relationship can be seen in many domains and tasks, including physicians’ 
confidence in their ability to make an accurate diagnosis [148], people’s confidence in 
their ability to detect deception [149], nurses’ confidence in their knowledge of basic life 
support tasks [150], and eyewitnesses’ confidence in their identification [151].   
In one study physicians made a diagnosis for two easy and two difficult medical cases, 
and rated their confidence in the decision. Although confidence was only slightly lower 
for the difficult cases, performance was far worse for these cases (5.8%) than the easier 
cases (55.3%) [148]. Similarly, a meta-analysis of 31 studies on eyewitness testimony 
found the average correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy was only 
barely better than chance (r = .07) [151]. Although the association between confidence 
and accuracy for forensic practitioners is poorly understood (due to a lack of accuracy 
data), there is no reason to believe a significant confidence-accuracy relationship exists. 
Eyewitness testimony research has shown that the confidence-accuracy relationship is 
slightly stronger when confidence is assessed at the same time as the identification [152]. 
As time passes, eyewitnesses often become more certain and confident in their judgment, 
a process referred to as “confidence hardening”. For example, between an identification 
and trial, an eyewitness may receive feedback from police that their identification is 
“correct”, learn of other evidence that implicates the defendant, and be prepared by the 
prosecution for trial [153]. Similarly, Oskamp [154] found that clinicians’ confidence 
increased as a function of the amount of information available to them, however there 
was no corresponding increase in the accuracy of their judgments. Taken together, these 
findings indicate that a forensic practitioner’s confidence will be most predictive of 
accuracy when recorded at the time of analysis. Confidence may change if they receive 
gratuitous information (about the case or accused), or receive feedback, regardless of its 
probative value. 
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Heavy reliance on confidence when evaluating an expert’s testimony might lead 
decision-makers to pay insufficient attention to factors that do predict an expert’s 
accuracy. Kahneman and Klein [155] propose that the best way to evaluate the accuracy 
of a specific judgment is to consider the validity of the environment in which the 
judgment was made, as well as the decision-maker’s history of learning the rules of the 
environment. Jurors should therefore be provided information regarding the validity and 
reliability of forensic procedures so that they may evaluate the evidence more 
appropriately. 
 
11. Feedback is essential for learning 
 Feedback provides a learner with information about the accuracy of their 
decisions. 
 The provision of accurate feedback aids learning in a variety of situations, 
including learning to interpret complex visual patterns. 
 Receiving feedback on varied and demanding examples is more likely to lead to 
robust learning, which generalizes to novel stimuli. 
Feedback helps us learn new skills or hone existing ones by providing information about 
the accuracy of our responses. Positive feedback informs us when a decision was correct, 
and negative feedback indicates when a decision was incorrect. The provision of 
feedback allows us to adapt and shape our behaviour to increase the number of correct 
decisions we make. Feedback should not be confused with reinforcement, which 
increases the likelihood that a certain behaviour will occur, irrespective of whether it is 
correct. Giving a dog a biscuit every time it barks will increase the frequency of barking 
regardless of whether that is the desired (correct) response. When we provide feedback 
we usually do so in the hope that it will serve as a positive reinforcement and increase the 
frequency of correct responding, but this is not inevitably the case. 
Although learning can occur in the absence of feedback, learning in the presence of 
accurate feedback generally occurs more quickly and is more robust and long-lasting. 
The provision of inaccurate, selective or unreliable feedback that is not directly related to 
actual performance can hamper learning, and false feedback (the provision of misleading 
feedback) may increase error rates [156]. 
The absence of accurate, timely feedback is to blame for poor performance in a variety of 
situations. For example, forensic psychologists’ clinical “gut-instinct” judgments of the 
risk of re-offending are less accurate than actuarially-based predictions, which are based 
on empirical data and standardized assessment criteria. This may, in part, be because the 
psychologist is unlikely to receive accurate and/or timely feedback about which clients 
committed another offence and which ones did not [157]. 
The effect of feedback has been demonstrated in a variety of fields. In education, the 
provision of feedback is one of the most powerful influences on classroom learning 
[158], and researchers have studied the importance of feedback on elite sports 
performance [159]. More relevant to forensic science, is the study of the role of feedback 
in perceptual learning tasks. Perceptual learning involves changes to an individual’s 
perceptual systems (e.g. vision, hearing and taste) that increase sensitivity to stimuli, for 
example increasing our ability to identify a stimulus or to differentiate between two 
similar stimuli [160]. Perceptual learning can be demonstrated with simple visual stimuli 
as well as with more complex visual patterns, such as faces.  
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A relevant example of feedback training leading to perceptual learning for more complex 
patterns can be seen in the work of White and colleagues [161], who demonstrated that 
feedback increased accuracy in an unfamiliar face matching task. This task requires 
participants to decide whether two images are of the same unfamiliar person. This is the 
basis of many identity verification processes, for example at border crossings and in the 
identification of suspects from CCTV images, but has been shown to be surprisingly 
difficult and error-prone [162]. Critically, it has also been shown that experience alone is 
not enough to improve performance, with passport staff with up to 20 years of experience 
sometimes performing no better than recent recruits [84] (see Figure 1 in Section 8). 
However, when participants were given trial-by-trial feedback their accuracy improved, 
and this improvement was maintained after feedback was removed. Furthermore, this 
improvement generalised to images not used in training, and the feedback effect was 
largest for those participants who had initially performed most poorly. 
Other studies have also shown that feedback can lead to learning which generalises to 
novel cases, and there is some evidence that generalisation is more likely when the 
training set is highly variable. For example, participants given feedback training in a 
mock luggage-screening task, which required them to detect dangerous objects in bags, 
showed greater generalization of learning when the training involved more varied 
targets[163]. Interestingly, a more uniform training set resulted in faster and more 
accurate responses during training, but did not generalize to novel test images; suggesting 
that although variability in training materials can make initial training more difficult, it is 
likely to lead to more robust learning effects.  
Inappropriate feedback can sometimes have undesirable effects. Eyewitnesses to a crime 
are sometimes asked to identify the perpetrator from a lineup. If after making their 
selection the witness receives feedback suggesting their decision was correct (for 
example being told “Well done, you identified the suspect”) this is likely to lead to 
increased confidence in the decision regardless of its accuracy, together with an inflated 
estimate of the ease of the identification decision and of the quality of the original 
viewing experience of the crime event [164]. In order to counter this effect psychologists 
recommend that the witness’ decision and confidence be recorded prior to the provision 
of feedback (see Section 10). 
Many areas of forensic science require practitioners to make difficult discriminations 
between complex visual patterns. These include the analysis of fingerprints, tool marks, 
voices, CCTV images, bullet casings, and tire and tread marks. The psychological 
research reviewed above suggests that repeated exposure to these stimuli over many 
years will not be sufficient to improve performance. However, training involving the 
timely provision of accurate feedback is likely to increase accuracy, and if the training set 
is varied and challenging, the resultant learning is more likely to generalise to novel 
stimuli. One implication of this research for the forensic sciences is that practitioners 
should routinely analyse cases where ground truth is known, so that they can be given 
meaningful feedback on their decision once it has been recorded. 
 
12. Discussion 
We have synthesized a range of mainstream research findings of particular relevance 
to forensic practitioners. Our goal has been to educate, and hopefully stimulate, 
greater awareness of these effects, so that practitioners might engage with these 
studies and conclusions to improve their procedures and practices. Institutions and 
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individuals should be thinking about what this kind of research might mean for 
traditional practices, and how conventional assumptions and practices might be 
revised to enhance performance and avoid criticism [19]. It seems likely, as 
publications by multi-disciplinary committees of the U.S. Commission on Forensic 
Sciences indicate, that forensic scientists will need to work hand-in-hand with 
cognitive scientists and experimental psychologists to reform and enhance their 
selection processes, procedures, work practices, workflows and resulting evidentiary 
products. 
Rather than prescribe wholesale reform, we have preferred to present research and 
make a few suggestions where implications appear compelling. What forensic 
practitioners and their institutions ultimately do is an issue for them; however, they 
should be aware that these sorts of issues are gradually coming to the attention of 
lawyers and judges. Though, we also note that few judges have been willing to 
exclude forensic science evidence on the basis of human factors, at this stage. It is 
difficult to anticipate what judges might do over time. Nevertheless, we note that 
several jurisdictions have adopted admissibility and procedural rules directly 
concerned with reliability (e.g. most US jurisdictions, Canada and recently England) 
and that issues of bias have historically gained the attention of judges (e.g. [165]). 
Bias is a subject on which the judiciary believes it possesses expertise; even if largely 
limited to interests, conflicts of interest, and perceived conflicts of interest.  
We also appreciate that legal categories do not necessarily align with scientific 
definitions and orientations. The way English and Australian courts place emphasis 
on training and experience in a “field”, as opposed to demonstrated ability relative to 
non-experts, is a good example [119, 121]. Similarly, English courts might be 
considered insufficiently sensitive to the risks posed by human factors and the ability 
of traditional trials safeguards, such as cross-examination, to explore unconscious 
influences on cognitive processes remote in time and place from events [166]. While 
accepting that forensic practitioners cannot ignore admissibility standards and 
procedural rules, we recommend caution in relying too heavily on legal (i.e. non-
scientific) approaches as the basis for practice and justification. As professionals, 
forensic practitioners should look to high quality empirical research to support their 
procedures, practices and evidence. This research should be undertaken by scientists, 
including cognitive scientists. To look to courts for epistemic support is a mistake. As 
one eminent Australian judge and scholar noted [167]: 
“… the last thing I would wish to encourage … is obsequiousness towards lawyers, either 
practitioners or judges. There are good social reasons for treating the legal system’s 
normative and adjudicatory authority with respect, but none for endowing it with 
intellectual authority.”  
Regardless of what courts and lawyers do, we recommend that forensic practitioners 
engage with cognitive science research and cognitive scientists. As this article 
illustrates, there is scope for helping forensic practitioners to avoid cognitive pitfalls 
(e.g. in exposure to gratuitous information or relying on memory) and improving 
performance in ways that might assist with both accuracy (e.g. using the wisdom of 
independent forensic practitioners) and the provision of comprehensible evidence. 
Such insights might also assist with epistemic humility and the need to take very 
seriously the dangers of mis- or non-communication of complex and technical forms 
of evidence [19]. It is unlikely that forensic practitioners can resolve these sorts of 
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issues on their own, but they are precisely the kinds of issues that cognitive scientists 
understand and might assist with. 
Most of the risks to the forensic sciences, forensic science institutions (whether 
public or commercial) and their social legitimacy are associated with non-
engagement with mainstream scientific research and methods. By reading into 
cognitive science and experimental psychology forensic practitioners might better 
understand their procedures and abilities, along with their limitations. Simultaneously 
they might be able to enhance performance and generate improved ways of 
producing and presenting evidentiary products in ways that accurately embody and 
convey what is known. Such responses would seem to be consistent with the kinds of 
expectations that a modern society has of both state-employed forensic practitioners 
and independent forensic science providers. 
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Highlights 
 
Includes ten themes from cognitive scientific endeavours applied to forensics.  
Covers expertise, memory, bias, decision-making, feedback, and communication. 
Contains insights that challenge commonly held beliefs about human performance. 
Tailored for and readily accessible to forensic practitioners, lawyers, and judges. 
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